Actually, according to this
view the mind attends to a completely new and different object each
moment. For example, take the mundane experience of listening
attentively to a song as it plays. In terms of conventional designation
one can describe this song as undergoing alteration and change as it
plays. But according to the view of radical momentariness, each moment
of attentive listening requires a new and different object. So instead
of listening to "a song" there are now how many "songs" or "sub-songs"
or "pieces of song"? 100 thousand?... 100 million?... 100 trillion?...
Is this not arbitrary? How could it not be? Ven. Sujato:
Thus
impermanence becomes, not simply being subject to birth and death, rise
and fall, but the momentary dissolution of phenomena – one dhamma rises
and ceases in an instant, leaving no trace of residue in the next.
Samadhi becomes, not an exalted, stable coalescence of mind, but a
‘momentary samadhi’ running after the fluctuations of phenomena. The
path becomes, not a gradual program of spiritual development, but a
‘path-moment’, gone in a flash. And the mind itself becomes just a
series of ‘mind-moments’.... This idea seems to derive some of its
impressiveness from its air of acrid, pessimistic, reductionist
severity, which is often mistaken as a sign of really uncompromising
wisdom.
....
(a) adhering to the idea of a direct perception of momentary
dissolution without accepting the existence of discrete, momentary
dhammas is nonsensical; (b) the doctrine of momentariness is itself
arbitrary with no demonstrable basis; and therefore both are untenable
views. Ven. Sujato:
Find this hard to swallow? You might be
interested to know that in contemporary abhidhamma circles it is,
apparently, the orthodox position that the series of ‘mind-moments’ can
only be directly seen by Buddhas, and perhaps chief disciples. This is,
admittedly, challenged by some, who claim it can be seen in meditation.
In just the same way, a Christian meditator will claim to see God, or a
Hindu to see the universal Self. Seek and ye shall find. The very fact
that such a controversy could possibly arise is a sign how far we have
drifted from the Buddha’s pragmatic empiricism.
.....
Buddhaghosa, Dhammasaá¹…gaṇi Aá¹á¹hakathÄ�:
Herein,
the continued present (santatipaccuppanna) finds mention in the
commentaries (atthakatha); the enduring or long present
(addhapaccuppanna) in the discourses (sutta).
Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis:
The
theory of impermanence in Buddhism has been generally misunderstood
because it came to be confused with a later theory known as the
'doctrine of moments' (ksanavada/ kanavada), which was formulated from a
logical analysis of the process of change (parinama) by the later
Buddhist scholars belonging to the scholastic (abhidhamma) tradition.
But such a theory is conspicuous by its absence in the early discourses.
von Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness:
There
can be no doubt that the theory of momentariness cannot be traced back
to the beginnings of Buddhism or even the Buddha himself. It does not
fit the practically orientated teachings of early Buddhism and clearly
bears the mark of later doctrinal elaboration. Thus in the
Nik�yas/Āgamas there are many passages which attribute duration to
material and even mental entities, whereas there is, at least to my
knowledge, no passage which testifies to the stance that all conditioned
entities are momentary.... Furthermore, the fact that the theory of
momentariness was a controversial issue among the various schools of the
so-called Hīnay�na indicates that it is not canonical.
Sujato, The Mystique of the Abhidhamma:
In
the later abhidhamma, the treatment of time is dominated by a radical
new theory, totally unlike anything in the suttas or even the canonical
abhidhamma, the theory of moments (khaṇav�da).... Now it is quite
possible to take this theory, compare it with the suttas, and refute it
point by point. But here I would simply like to point out what an
implausible and useless idea it is.
Bodhesako, Change: An Examination of Impermanence in Experience:
Indeed,
although the four Nik�yas occupy some 5,500 pages of print in their
abbreviated roman-script edition, there seems to be not a single
statement anywhere within them that requires us to understand thereby
(in opposition to the above passages) a doctrine of flux. On the
contrary, the Suttas are wholly consistent on this point (as on others).
Therefore even in precisely those passages where we would most expect
to find such a doctrine, if it were to be found in the Nik�yas at all,
the assertion is conspicuously absent.