Y is CNN showing about Mao Zhedong??!
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Originally posted by haha879:
Y is CNN talking about this dictator helping china revolution and talking good stuff about him??? He cause more then millions of death and he is no differents from the nuts kim jong li ... if he is still alive they will be still in hell. and y is sg showing this
Because CNN also happened to hire plenty of CHEAP CHINESE employees in their last recruitment run.Tell me if you are not able to hit a CHINESE if you throw a stone on the streets now.
You're more likely to hit a CHINESE than a HONDA.
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Originally posted by lotus999:
originally posted by atobe:
it is a matter of psychological conditioning…i thought haha879 said it is cnn and not sg’s cna.
If you had carefully read haha879 opening piece in this thread, you would have appreciated the basis of my response.
See the highlighted portion in his piece that you probably missed when reading in a hurry.
Originally posted by haha879:
Y is CNN talking about this dictator helping china revolution and talking good stuff about him??? He cause more then millions of death and he is no differents from the nuts kim jong li ... if he is still alive they will be still in hell. and y is sg showing this
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Originally posted by parn:
Because CNN also happened to hire plenty of CHEAP CHINESE employees in their last recruitment run.Tell me if you are not able to hit a CHINESE if you throw a stone on the streets now.
You're more likely to hit a CHINESE than a HONDA.
If you throw your stone in China - for sure you will hit a Chinese, but do you think you will hit one with your stone thrown in India, or Africa, or Indonesia ?If you are referring to Singapore - nearly 75% of the Singapore population of 3.5 million Citizens is Chinese - between 4.5 million and 3.5 million are foreigners resident in Singapore.
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Originally posted by pearlie27:
LKY saying something like if you keep doing something over time people would get used ot it.
Are you referring to this famous lines from LKY spoken and lost in the archives of Parliamentary records ?
"Repression, Sir is a habit that grows. I am told it is like making love-it is always easier the second time! The first time there may be pangs of conscience, a sense of guilt. But once embarked on this course with constant repetition you get more and more brazen in the attack.
All you have to do is to dissolve organizations and societies and banish and detain the key political workers in these societies. Then miraculously everything is tranquil on the surface.
Then an intimidated press and the government-controlled radio together can regularly sing your praises, and slowly and steadily the people are made to forget the evil things that have already been done, or if these things are referred to again they're conveniently distorted and distorted with impunity, because there will be no opposition to contradict."
- Lee Kuan Yew as an opposition PAP member speaking to David Marshall, Singapore Legislative Assembly, Debates, 4 October, 1956
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Originally posted by Ah Chia:
Since this thread is about Mao Zedong, here is a dialogue between Mao and Kissinger:
Memorandum of Conversation
Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Mao Tsetung, Chairman, Politburo, Chinese Communist Party
Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
(At 11:00 p.m. February 17, 1973 at a meeting in a villa near the Guest House where Dr. Kissinger and his party were staying, Prime Minister Chou En-lai informed Dr. Kissinger that he and Winston Lord were invited to meet with Chairman Mao Tsetung at 11:30 p.m. that evening. He told Dr. Kissinger that he would come to the Guest House shortly to escort him to the Chairman’s residence.
Dr. Kissinger and his delegation members at the meeting went back to the Guest House. Prime Minister Chou En-lai came to the Guest House at 11:20 p.m. and rode with Dr. Kissinger to Chungnahai. Mr. Chu, Deputy Director of Protocol, accompanied Mr. Lord. Prime Minister Chou En-lai escorted Dr. Kissinger into the outer room of the Guest House and then through another room to Chairman Mao’s sitting room.
The Chairman was helped up from his chair by his young female attendant and came forward to greet Dr. Kissinger. Photographers took pictures. He welcomed Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Kissinger pointed out that it was almostly exactly a year ago that he had first met the Chairman.
The Chairman then greeted Mr. Lord and commented that he was so young, younger than the interpreters. Mr. Lord replied that he was in any event older than the interpreters. The Chairman then motioned to the large easy chairs and the parties sat down. The photographers continued to take pictures.)http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100320.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/index.htm
What is the purpose of your posting the conversation between Chairman Mao with Dr Kissinger ?How does a country like the USA - which you deride as evil - help in the image of Mao who is condemned by the millions of Chinese having suffered under Mao's vain attempts at leading China ?
Britain's PM Churchill had provided leadership in a moment of crisis, and helped Britain to recover from its defeat at Dunkirk in WW2, and steered Britain to victory by co-opting the USA to defeat Hitler.
Fortunately, the Democratic practice in UK allowed the Citizens to throw out Churchill, who was no good at managing UK during the hard won Peace.
It was not ingratitude towards Churchill, who graciously retired and stepped down to allow more capable persons to steer UK forward.
Unfortunately, for countries that are run by political autocrats and despots - the citizens are made to suffer the consequences of those who have passed their moment in history and prolonged their irrelevance, only to bring the country backwards : economically, politically, and socially.
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How does a country like the USA - which you deride as evil - help in the image of Mao who is condemned by the millions of Chinese having suffered under Mao's vain attempts at leading China ?
I don't consider USA evil, but aggressive and has huge ambitions to dominate the world.
Since you are deeply opposed to Mao, I won't defend him, since it would be a futile effort.
Britain's PM Churchill had provided leadership in a moment of crisis, and helped Britain to recover from its defeat at Dunkirk in WW2, and steered Britain to victory by co-opting the USA to defeat Hitler.
There is criticism of his WWII leadership by some writers also.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/buchanan/buchanan81.html
http://ourstory.asia1.com.sg/war/headline/church.html
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Originally posted by Ah Chia:
I don't consider USA evil, but aggressive and has huge ambitions to dominate the world.
Since you are deeply opposed to Mao, I won't defend him, since it would be a futile effort.
There is criticism of his WWII leadership by some writers also.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/buchanan/buchanan81.html
http://ourstory.asia1.com.sg/war/headline/church.html
No, I am not deeply opposed towards Mao, as I have said - he stayed longer then it was neccessary.
He should have left the political scene when he had served his time of relevance, and instead he continued to linger to control the helm of a sinking ship in a storm, and nearly capsized the entire ship.
For his vanity in extending his own make belief sense of usefulness, he caused misery to millions and desroyed generations of precious history from moments of inspired madness that he unleased onto the Chinese population.
He served his usefulness and made his positive mark on history, and should have left the management of a modern China to those who are better trained and more abled than himself.
Unfortunately for China, Mao could not bring himself to the same position as Deng Xiaopeng had done - and Deng had so little trouble in accepting his own finite position in China's History.
The same political mistakes are now being played out in Singapore by one dominant person's ambitious attempt to push his own hidden agenda towards posterity.
No one is perfect, and leaders do not become great by being over cautious or without the daring to make mistakes and learning the expensive lessons paid in blood.
At least, Churchill had the strength, courage, foresight, and the political skills to galvanise the spirit of the British during their moments of crisis, and was able to deliver the heavy and difficult tasks that others before him have failed.
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At least, Churchill had the strength, courage, foresight, and the political skills to galvanise the spirit of the British during their moments of crisis
According to some writer's interpretation, Churchill also schemed to get into the position of Prime Minister:
...On news the Germans had reached Narvik before British ships could leave harbor, Churchill was unperturbed. He told cabinet colleagues, including Prime Minister Chamberlain, that the German occupation, "should not be on terms unfavorable to us," insisting that England was, "in a far better position than we had been to date."
In reality it was Churchill who was in the far better position. That was, in position to replace Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Churchill's deliberate chaotic bungling of the plans for a Norway invasion had led Chamberlain to assume personal day-to-day responsibility for the Norwegian operation. He had been asked to do so, in a calculated appeal, by Churchill. From that point, the trap had been set against Chamberlain as well.
The conduct of the British campaign against Norway was ludicrous, and Churchill was directly responsible for the disaster. He personally countered orders of the military chiefs of staff, without even informing them. He sent troops of the 24th Guards brigade by boat, without artillery, engineers or transport, with orders to capture Narvik, after it had been firmly secured by German forces...
...When it became obvious that he must step down, Chamberlain sought to put the name of his Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, to the King as his successor, a move which Halifax, the leading Round Table figure in the Cabinet, deftly declined in favor of Churchill.
On May 10, just in the hours the German Wehrmacht launched the blitzkrieg against Holland and Belgium, Churchill was called by the King to form a new government.
Winston Spencer Churchill, then 66, had been promoted by the Round Table at that critical juncture, not because he especially appreciated the need to mobilize Britain for war against Germany, though this was a necessary precondition; nor because he was pragmatic enough, contrary to Chamberlain, to be willing to strike an alliance with Stalin to defeat Hitler, though this was also a necessary precondition.
Churchill was chosen, above all, because the chief aim of Round Table policy was the clash between Russia and Germany. That, in order to draw the United States into the war their geopolitics had brought about. Chamberlain's role in setting Germany against Russia had exhausted its usefulness, once the secret German-Soviet Friendship Treaty had been signed.
A new ploy, other than playing up to Hitler through appeasement, was now required to advance the game. That ploy was called Winston Churchill.
For years Churchill had carefully cultivated the attentions of Moscow, as Britain's most vocal opponent of appeasing Germany, through, among others, London ambassador Ivan Maisky. Maisky apparently never quite realized how he and Moscow were merely being maneuvered by the sly Churchill, to lead the Soviet Union into a bloodbath with Germany, in pursuit of British geopolitical strategy. Chamberlain had merely represented another way to accomplish the same bloody goal, a German-Soviet war, by playing to the German side against the Soviet Union...
http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/History/MacKinder
...This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group. Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain, including several members of the second circle of the Milner Group...
In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things:
(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia...
http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html
...Accordingly, many of the appeasers, when this point was reached in March 1938 went over to the anti-Bolshevik or "three-bloc" point of view, while some even went into the "peace at any price" group.
It is likely that Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare went by this road from appeasement to anti-Bolshevism. At any rate, few influential people were still in the appeasement group by 1939 in the sense that they believed that Germany could ever be satisfied. Once this was realized, it seemed to many that the only solution was to bring Germany into contact with, or even collision with, the Soviet Union...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42
Correspondent: What is the significance of the Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Soviet Union and Germany?
Mao Tse-tung: The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty is the result of the growing socialist strength of the Soviet Union and the policy of peace persistently followed by the Soviet government.
The treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie represented by Chamberlain and Daladier sought to instigate a Soviet-German war, has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, strengthened peace between the Soviet Union and Germany, and safeguarded the progress of socialist construction in the Soviet Union.
In the East it deals a blow to Japan and helps China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance to Japan and deals a blow to the capitulators. All this provides a basis for helping the people throughout the world to win freedom and liberation. Such is the full political significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty...
http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/
Heath: I think the Soviet Union has a lot of troubles. They are facing domestic economic difficulties and agricultural predicament, and there are also differences within the leadership, over questions of tactics and timing, not over long-term strategy.
Mao: I think the Soviet Union is busy with its own affairs and unable to deal with Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, China and the Pacific. I think it will lose.
Heath: However, its military strength is continually augmented. Although the Soviet Union has encountered troubles at many places in the world, its strength is continuing to grow. Therefore, we deem this to be the principal threat. Does the Chairman think the Soviet Union constitutes a menace to China?
Mao: We are prepared for it to come, but it will collapse if it comes. It has only a handful of troops, and you Europeans are so frightened of it! Some people in the West are always trying to direct this calamity toward China. Your senior, Chamberlain, and also Daladier of France were the ones who pushed Germany eastward.
Heath: I opposed Mr. Chamberlain then.http://english.pladaily.com.cn/special/mao/txt/w24.htm
Neville Chamberlain schemed and plotted to let Hitler attack eastwards, wanted to set the Germans against the Russian, let the two finish each other off.
It was the result of his policies that Hitler could go so far, sadly the british is very stubborn; refuses to admit the truth and is bent on distorting history.
According to their bullshit dirty filthy propaganda, Chamberlain was only a moron, a fool to appease Hitler.
This is a nonsense.
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Lolx i thot It the Japs who kill 30k of Chinese in Nanking?
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Memorandum of Conversation
Beijing, October 21, 1975, 5:07–6:08 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People’s Republic of China
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of PRCLO, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P’ing, Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
T’ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA,
(Interpreter)
Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRCLO, Washington
Ting Yüan-hung, Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic
Affairs, MFA
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, MFA, (Interpreter) (plus two notetakers)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Amb. George H. W. Bush, Chief of USLO, Peking
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Miss Anne Boddicker, White House (notetaker)
SUBJECT
Southern Flank of Europe
[The press takes photos while the group is seated.]
Kissinger: Not all of us have recovered from the luncheon yet.
Teng Hsiao-p’ing: Yes, it seemed very arduous.As you know,
you cannot have a hot pot except in a very relaxed
atmosphere because that will take a half hour.
Kissinger: I have not walked so much since I was in the infantry
during the war. [Laughter] To me this is a Great March. [Laughter].
Teng Hsiao-p’ing: Yes, and when I was on the Long March I walked
half the 25,000 li on foot; the other half was on the back of some
kind of animal, a horse or such. At that time the highest luxury
was to have one horse for each man.
Kissinger: I can imagine.
[The press leaves.]
Teng: So today we still have a bit of time left. Although it isn’t very
great, we still have the opportunity to have an exchange of views. Yesterday
we had the opportunity to exchange opinions with you on questions
pertaining to the international situation, policy and strategic. We
think the exchange of views was frank, and we feel that such an exchange
is beneficial for mutual understanding and also to the further
development of possible cooperation between our two sides.
Kissinger: I agree.
Teng: So as for the questions pertaining to strategy, we don’t have
anything new to say on our side. And if you have nothing new to say
on your side, then we can perhaps stop right here on that issue and
turn to something else. But if you wish to tell us anything on that or
any other position, you can tell us that.
Kissinger: I agree we have covered the issue of strategy and stated
the various approaches. I have listed the possible topics yesterday and
it is up to the Vice Premier what he thinks is most suitable.
Teng: And you have travelled the world several times in the past
year and we are willing to listen to whatever you would like to say to
us or whatever you think necessary to tell us, or whatever you find interesting
to have an exchange of views on. If you are interested, you
might begin with the southern flank of Europe.
Kissinger: All right. Mr. Habib would like me to try to convince
you to vote with us on the Korean question, but I don’t think I can do
that in one hour. [Laughter] He has approached everyone except the
Pope on that. [Laughter]
Well, on the southern flank of Europe, we have Portugal, Spain,
Italy, Greece and Turkey. Each presenting a different situation.
In the case of Portugal, we find a situation where as a result of
forty years of authoritarian rule, the democratic forces are not well organized, and where the political structure is very weak. The military
have adopted some of the philosophy of African liberation movements,
which they fought for 25 years. And the Communist Party of Cunhal,
who spent his exile in Czechoslovakia—which is a curious place as a
choice of exile—is very much under the influence of the Soviet Union.
[Teng leans down beneath the table and spits into the spittoon beside
his chair.]
In this vacuum, the Communist Party that I described achieved
disproportionate influence, and for a while it seemed on the verge of
dominating the situation. I think this trend has been arrested. And we
are working with our West European friends to strengthen the forces
that are opposed to Cunhal. Some of these forces unfortunately are better
at rhetoric than at organization. But we think that the situation has
improved, and we will continue to improve it.
Teng: We heard recent news that some of the military officers formerly
under . . .
Chiao: . . . Gonçalves.
Teng: . . . are prepared to stage a coup.
Kissinger: Yes. We had a report this morning they refused to turn
over their weapons.
Teng: The news goes that they are preparing to do something on
the 11th of November which is the date of the independence of Angola.
News so specific as this can’t be reliable.
Kissinger: No, I don’t believe this. We have the report that there
is one military unit that refuses to turn over its weapons. And there is
no question Gonçalves is on the side of the Soviet Union. But we hope
. . . We have been in touch with a number of other military leaders and
we would certainly not approve such a coup and we will certainly oppose
it.
Teng: But it is in our view that Portugal will see many reversals.
Kissinger: I agree.
Teng: And many trials of strength.
We are not in a position to do anything else in that part of the
world. There is one thing that we have done. They have approached
us many times for the establishment of diplomatic relations, which we
have not agreed to. Our point of departure is very simple: That is, we
do not want to do anything that would be helpful to any Soviet forces
gaining the upper hand.
Kissinger: I think that is a very wise policy. We support Antunes
and Soares. [Teng leans down and spits again.] Antunes was in Washington
a few weeks ago and we are cooperating with him. But I agree
with you that there will be many trials of strength. And the difficulty
of our West European friends is they relax after a temporary success.
When we come back here in December, we will see the situation
more clearly. But we are determined to resist a Soviet takeover there,
even if it leads to armed conflict. It will not go easily.
I mean, if they are planning a coup it will not be easy for them.
Now in Spain, the situation is more complicated. We have on the one
hand a regime on its last legs, because Franco is very old. But on the
other hand we do not want to repeat the situation of Portugal in Spain.
We have been approached on a number of occasions by the Spanish
Communist Party, but we consider it is controlled from Moscow.
What is your assessment?
Teng: There are contradictions between the Spanish Communist
Party and the Soviet Union. Among the revisionist Communist parties
in Europe it can be said that the contradictions between the Spanish
Communist Party and the Dutch Communist Party and the Soviet
Union are comparatively deeper.
Kissinger: We have been negotiating a continuation of our base
agreement with Spain, as you know. We will probably conclude this
agreement within the next six weeks. We do this because we do not
believe a shrinkage of American security interests in the Mediterranean
is in the security interest of the world. [Teng spits again] Together with
this, we are planning to set up a number of committees in the cultural
and economic fields so that in the case of a new situation we have organic
contacts with many levels of Spanish life.
Ch’iao: You mean after the regime is handed over to [Juan] Carlos?
Kissinger: Yes. We are setting up committees now in connection
with the base agreement so that when Franco leaves we will not have
to start, as we did in Portugal, looking around for contacts. We will
have this infrastructure.
Teng: It is our impression that the influence of the Spanish revisionist
party is not so deep as that of the Portuguese in the armed
forces. I don’t know whether your understanding would be the same.
Kissinger: One reason we need this base agreement is to stay in
contact with the Spanish military. Our assessment is at the higher levels
there is very little impact of what you call this revisionist party. At
the lower levels, we have had some reports they are doing some
recruiting.
Teng: The lowest levels do not play such a great role.Kissinger: We have heard at the level of Captains. But at the commanding
levels their influence can’t be compared with the Portuguese
situation.
Teng: But a captain is a very important man in African forces
[laughter] but perhaps not so in Europe.
Kissinger: Not quite so in Europe. [Laughter]
Teng: What is your impression of the Spanish Prince?
Ch’iao: Carlos.
Kissinger: He is a nice man. Naive. He doesn’t understand revolution
and doesn’t understand what he will face. He thinks he can do
it with good will. But his intentions are good. He’s a nice man. I don’t
think he is strong enough to manage events by himself.
Teng: We heard that Franco was going to hand over power to him.
Kissinger: We hear that every six months. But Mrs. Franco likes
the palace too much to leave. [Laughter]
Teng: He must be in his 80’s by now.
Kissinger: Yes, and not very active. In fact, he has a tendency to
fall asleep while you are talking to him. [Laughter] I’ve been there with
two Presidents, and he has fallen asleep both times. In fact, he had—
when I was there with President Nixon—a hypnotic effect. I saw him
falling asleep, so I fell asleep. So the only two people awake were President
Nixon and the Spanish Foreign Minister. [Laughter]
No, it would be better if he handed over the power.
Teng: What do you think of Yugoslavia?
Kissinger: We are concerned about Yugoslavia. We are concerned
that a number of things could happen after Tito’s death. There could
be a separatist movement from some of the provinces. There could be
a split within the Yugoslav Communist Party. Both of these could be
supported by the Soviet Union. And there could be Soviet military
intervention.
Teng: During the recent visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister Mr.
Bijedic, we gained from what he said, although in different words, that
they are also quite worried about such matters themselves.
Kissinger: In Montenegro—you know this—they discovered Soviet
activities within the country.
Teng: Yes, but then they were able to find out about all these espionage
activities and do something to end these activities.
Kissinger: Yes, but it shows the tendency of Soviet policy.
Teng: Indeed.
Kissinger: We are very interested in the independence and independent
policy of Yugoslavia. And you have noticed that in the last
year both the President and I have paid separate visits to Yugoslavia.
And we are going to begin selling them military equipment within the
next few weeks.
Teng: That will be very good. You must know that this nation is a
very militant one. Although there are some contradictions among the
various nationalities. And it seems to me that one of their relatively
strong points is that they are comparatively clear-minded about the situation
they face.
Kissinger: Yes. They will certainly fight if there is an invasion.
Teng: We have also posed this question to our European friends.
That is, if there occurs a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, what will happen?
And they felt that this was a difficult issue. And perhaps a similar
question will confront you. Of course I do not ask you for an answer
now. [They laugh.]
Kissinger: No, I can give you an answer. It is a difficult question.
It is politically a difficult question and it’s strategically a difficult question.
We are now doing some military planning for this contingency. I
can tell you this—you can keep secrets; I am not so convinced about
all of my colleagues [laughter]—we have asked General Haig, in his
capacity as American Commander, to do some planning.
T’ang: About Yugoslavia?
Kissinger: Yes. [There is some commotion on the Chinese side.]
Teng: The Chairman will be prepared to meet you at 6:30. [The
Secretary and Ambassador Bush exchange glances.] So, what . . . you
are in a dilemma about your program [because of Ambassador Bush’s
reception for the Secretary scheduled for the International Club].
Kissinger: No. He [Bush] has a dilemma. I would be delighted.
T’ang: How many people would you be prepared to take with you?
Kissinger: The Ambassador, Mr. Lord . . .
Wang: Would your wife be going?
Kissinger: Has she been invited?
Wang: It is up to you.
Teng: We are willing to listen to your request or your opinion. It
is up to you to suggest whom you would like to take on your side and
whom you would like participating in the meeting and whom you
would like to have shake hands.
Kissinger: Then I think . . . Can everyone here shake hands, and
my wife? And then for the meeting Ambassador Bush, Mr. Lord, and
Mr. Habib.
Teng: You mean all those seated here and your wife?
Kissinger: Yes, if you can find my wife. [Laughter] She’s probably
out shopping.
T’ang: We will try to find her.
Kissinger: If you can find her, it will save me a lot of money.
[Laughter]
T’ang: So she is in the shops now?
[The Secretary discusses with Sonnenfeldt where she might be or
whether she will have departed for the reception.]
Kissinger: Maybe we can still catch her.
[Wang Hai-jung goes out.]
Teng: So perhaps we can continue for about 15 minutes, and then
perhaps you can make various preparations. [He spits into his spittoon.]
Kissinger: What I have said to you about military preparations
with respect to Yugoslavia is known only to the top leaders of three
European governments. Schmidt knows about it, of course. But it is a
very complicated problem logistically. Because our best means of entering
is through Italy and that is logistically very difficult. We can perhaps
talk about this again when we come back in a few weeks.
Teng: Yes, and recently Italy has returned the B Zone of Trieste to
Yugoslavia. We believe this is quite good.
Kissinger: Yes.
[Nancy T’ang gets up to leave. Mrs. Shih moves to the table.]
Shih: She is going to make some preparations. I will take her place.
Teng: So long as they have weapons in their hands, the Yugoslavs
will fight.
Kissinger: We think so too. But as I said, we are starting in a few
weeks to sell them some anti-tank weapons, and some other equipment.
Teng: We are thinking that in that area the main problem is conventional
weapons and not nuclear weapons.
Kissinger: That is correct. Though any conflict that involves us and
the Soviet Union is very complicated. It is bound to involve nuclear
threats anyway. But the weapons we are selling to Yugoslavia are conventional
weapons.
Teng: If the Soviet Union can control Yugoslavia, then the chessboard
of Soviet strategy in Europe will become alive. The next will be
Romania and Albania.
Kissinger: If the Soviet Union can get away with a military move
on Yugoslavia, we will face a very grave situation. [Teng nods emphatically
in agreement.] Which will require serious countermeasures.
Teng: For that not only involves military strategy; it will also have
a very serious political influence. Its impact at least will spread to the
whole of the southern flank.
Kissinger: I think that is correct. It will affect Italy and Germany,
and France.
Teng: Also the Mediterranean. And the Middle East.
Kissinger: If this happens, whatever we do in Yugoslavia—which
depends on the circumstances in which things develop—will lead to a
very serious situation. We would not accept it. It will lead at least to
serious countermeasures. It will not be like Czechoslovakia.
[Teng glances at his watch.]
What is your view on the Italian situation?
Teng: Well, one can hardly see the trend of the development of the
situation in Italy. To us, it is all blank. We don’t know how to look at
the situation. Perhaps you know more clearly.
Kissinger: Perhaps the Foreign Minister should stop on the way
back from the UN to call on the Pope. Gromyko was there a few weeks
ago. [Laughter]
Teng: Really?
Kissinger: Actually you could be helpful in Italy, we think. At least
with some of the Socialists. The Christian Democratic Party has very
weak leadership. [They nod in agreement.] Their Prime Minister, Moro,
also has a tendency to fall asleep when you meet him. [Laughter]
Teng: They change their Prime Ministers several times in a year. I
don’t know how many times since the War.
Kissinger: Yes, but it’s always the same group. But the ruling group
of the Christian Democratic Party is not very disciplined.
We totally oppose what is called in Italy the “historic compromise.”
We do not give visas to Italian Communists to come to the United States.
[Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Sonnenfeldt confer.]
Teng: In my view the so-called “historic compromise” cannot
succeed.
Kissinger: Well, it can succeed, but it will lead to a disaster for the
non-Communist parties.
I’ve just been handed a telegram that they have put a Communist
into an Italian Parliamentary delegation that is coming to Washington,
that we didn’t select.
But that is a secondary issue. We will totally oppose it.
Teng: We think, with regard to the situation in Italy, where our two
sides differ is that we don’t attach so much importance to whether the
Communist Party of Italy gets the power. It is not significant.
Kissinger: No, it is of importance because it will have an effect on
France and even in the Federal Republic. And it is of significance to
the support that America can give to NATO if there is a government
there with a large Communist Party in the government.
Teng: [Laughs] Such a so-called “historic compromise” was once
effected by the French. That was shortly after the War, when De Gaulle
was in power. He let the Communist Party of France take part in the
government, and Thorez was in power.
Kissinger: But that was in a totally different situation. At that time
they were declining, and not increasing.
Teng: The French Communist Party got several seats in the French
Cabinet. One of them was the Minister of the Air Force, who was a
Communist. [He laughs.] The decision to bomb Algeria was made by
this man exactly. This we call their “performance on the stage.”
Shall we end our talk here today? And prepare to meet the
Chairman?
Kissinger: Can we leave from here?
Teng: Yes. We can take a short rest.
Kissinger: Okay.
Teng: But we will leave from here directly and meet you there.
[The meeting ended. The American party moved to another room
to await Mrs. Kissinger, who arrived shortly, and then to depart for
Changnanhai for the meeting with Chairman Mao Tsetung.] -
Originally posted by Ah Chia:
According to some writer's interpretation, Churchill also schemed to get into the position of Prime Minister:
...On news the Germans had reached Narvik before British ships could leave harbor, Churchill was unperturbed. He told cabinet colleagues, including Prime Minister Chamberlain, that the German occupation, "should not be on terms unfavorable to us," insisting that England was, "in a far better position than we had been to date."
In reality it was Churchill who was in the far better position. That was, in position to replace Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Churchill's deliberate chaotic bungling of the plans for a Norway invasion had led Chamberlain to assume personal day-to-day responsibility for the Norwegian operation. He had been asked to do so, in a calculated appeal, by Churchill. From that point, the trap had been set against Chamberlain as well.
The conduct of the British campaign against Norway was ludicrous, and Churchill was directly responsible for the disaster. He personally countered orders of the military chiefs of staff, without even informing them. He sent troops of the 24th Guards brigade by boat, without artillery, engineers or transport, with orders to capture Narvik, after it had been firmly secured by German forces...
...When it became obvious that he must step down, Chamberlain sought to put the name of his Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, to the King as his successor, a move which Halifax, the leading Round Table figure in the Cabinet, deftly declined in favor of Churchill.
On May 10, just in the hours the German Wehrmacht launched the blitzkrieg against Holland and Belgium, Churchill was called by the King to form a new government.
Winston Spencer Churchill, then 66, had been promoted by the Round Table at that critical juncture, not because he especially appreciated the need to mobilize Britain for war against Germany, though this was a necessary precondition; nor because he was pragmatic enough, contrary to Chamberlain, to be willing to strike an alliance with Stalin to defeat Hitler, though this was also a necessary precondition.
Churchill was chosen, above all, because the chief aim of Round Table policy was the clash between Russia and Germany. That, in order to draw the United States into the war their geopolitics had brought about. Chamberlain's role in setting Germany against Russia had exhausted its usefulness, once the secret German-Soviet Friendship Treaty had been signed.
A new ploy, other than playing up to Hitler through appeasement, was now required to advance the game. That ploy was called Winston Churchill.
For years Churchill had carefully cultivated the attentions of Moscow, as Britain's most vocal opponent of appeasing Germany, through, among others, London ambassador Ivan Maisky. Maisky apparently never quite realized how he and Moscow were merely being maneuvered by the sly Churchill, to lead the Soviet Union into a bloodbath with Germany, in pursuit of British geopolitical strategy. Chamberlain had merely represented another way to accomplish the same bloody goal, a German-Soviet war, by playing to the German side against the Soviet Union...
http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/History/MacKinder
...This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group. Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain, including several members of the second circle of the Milner Group...
In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things:
(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia...
http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html
...Accordingly, many of the appeasers, when this point was reached in March 1938 went over to the anti-Bolshevik or "three-bloc" point of view, while some even went into the "peace at any price" group.
It is likely that Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare went by this road from appeasement to anti-Bolshevism. At any rate, few influential people were still in the appeasement group by 1939 in the sense that they believed that Germany could ever be satisfied. Once this was realized, it seemed to many that the only solution was to bring Germany into contact with, or even collision with, the Soviet Union...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42
Correspondent: What is the significance of the Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Soviet Union and Germany?
Mao Tse-tung: The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty is the result of the growing socialist strength of the Soviet Union and the policy of peace persistently followed by the Soviet government.
The treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie represented by Chamberlain and Daladier sought to instigate a Soviet-German war, has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, strengthened peace between the Soviet Union and Germany, and safeguarded the progress of socialist construction in the Soviet Union.
In the East it deals a blow to Japan and helps China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance to Japan and deals a blow to the capitulators. All this provides a basis for helping the people throughout the world to win freedom and liberation. Such is the full political significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty...
http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/
Heath: I think the Soviet Union has a lot of troubles. They are facing domestic economic difficulties and agricultural predicament, and there are also differences within the leadership, over questions of tactics and timing, not over long-term strategy.
Mao: I think the Soviet Union is busy with its own affairs and unable to deal with Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, China and the Pacific. I think it will lose.
Heath: However, its military strength is continually augmented. Although the Soviet Union has encountered troubles at many places in the world, its strength is continuing to grow. Therefore, we deem this to be the principal threat. Does the Chairman think the Soviet Union constitutes a menace to China?
Mao: We are prepared for it to come, but it will collapse if it comes. It has only a handful of troops, and you Europeans are so frightened of it! Some people in the West are always trying to direct this calamity toward China. Your senior, Chamberlain, and also Daladier of France were the ones who pushed Germany eastward.
Heath: I opposed Mr. Chamberlain then.http://english.pladaily.com.cn/special/mao/txt/w24.htm
Neville Chamberlain schemed and plotted to let Hitler attack eastwards, wanted to set the Germans against the Russian, let the two finish each other off.
It was the result of his policies that Hitler could go so far, sadly the british is very stubborn; refuses to admit the truth and is bent on distorting history.
According to their bullshit dirty filthy propaganda, Chamberlain was only a moron, a fool to appease Hitler.
This is a nonsense.
For all that it is worth - it remains to be "some writer's interpretation" - of past events that he was not even a participant living through that historical period.
Anyone can interprete the events, and no one can stop anyone from accepting the presented idea - "hook, sinker, and line".
It still does not bring any shine to Mao's damaged image when he live pass his time of being relevant in China's history.
The same is being experienced in Singapore today, and the damage to Singapore has cost Singaporean more then the sum of US$100 Billion over 52 years - and all due to the vanity of one single person who believe himself to be more intelligent than the sum total of all Singaporeans.
-
Originally posted by Ah Chia:
Still got something lah, China so big.
ya, a lot of people, poor people.